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Regulatory Domain and Regulatory Dexterity: Critiquing the UK 
Governance of ‘Fracking’ 
 
This article provides a critique of the UK Government’s regulatory response to 
‘fracking’.  It shows how Government has adopted two distinct schemas of regulation, 
which may usefully be classified under the headings ‘regulatory domain’ and 
‘regulatory dexterity’.  These schemas rely on very different interpretive conventions 
and are in many ways contradictory.  Yet, Government uses both ‘domain’ and 
‘dexterity’ arguments simultaneously in order to advance its policy in favour of 
fracking.  The article explains how two seemingly different regulatory approaches 
work together towards the same policy goal, and highlights the role of law in 
facilitating technological development.  
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this article is to examine the United Kingdom (UK) Government’s handling of 
the topical and divisive matter of the regulation of ‘fracking’.  Fracking (shorthand for ‘hydraulic 
fracturing’) is a controversial drilling technique used to extract previously inaccessible fossil fuels.  
Reports suggest that the UK has significant onshore resources of shale gas,1 which are now easier 
to exploit by employing fracking and which offer the possibility of a cheaper, cleaner, and more 
secure energy supply. As a result, moves are afoot to increase the rate and scale at which fracking 
takes place.  This has met with strong public opposition,2 but current Government policy (and that 
                                                        
1 Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), The Unconventional Hydrocarbon Resources of Britain’s Onshore Basins 
– Shale Gas (DECC 2013). 
2  ‘How Summer Fracking Protest Unfolded in Sussex Village’ (BBC News, 17 April 2014) 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-sussex-26765926 accessed 30 June 2016; W. Jordan, ‘Public Opposition to 
Fracking Grows’ (YouGov, 19 May 2015) https://yougov.co.uk/news/2015/05/19/opposition-fracking-britain-
grows/ accessed 30 June 2016; J. Halliday, ‘Protesters Urge North Yorkshire Councillors to Vote Against Fracking’ 
The Guardian (London, 23 May 2016). 
of the previous Conservative-led coalition Government) is decidedly in favour of developing the 
UK’s shale gas industry.   
 
In pursuit of this policy, Government has adopted two distinct strategies or ‘schemas’ of 
regulation, which the article conceptualises as ‘regulatory domain’ and ‘regulatory dexterity’.  
‘Domain’ and ‘dexterity’ provide alternative vantage points from which to view regulation and 
make use of distinct sets of interpretive conventions.  They adopt different scales of analysis 
(abstract/concrete); rely on different characterisations of technology (analogous/dissimilar); locate 
regulation differently in space (multilevel/national) and time (continuity/change); focus on 
different aspects of regulation (broad coverage/specific inadequacies); and lead to different 
regulatory responses (defending against reform/introducing new tailor-made legislation).  
Government simultaneously invokes both schemas, even though they seemingly contradict each 
other.  
 
These contradictions are examined in detail.  An approach based on ‘regulatory domain’ 
involves analysing regulation in the abstract.  It entails taking a synoptic view of the regulatory 
landscape, looking at regulation as a whole rather than the individual parts of it.  Government 
maps the general regulatory regimes applicable to fracking, providing a simplified illustration of 
the great expanse of legal provision.  Because fracking is treated as analogous to conventional 
drilling technologies, it is said to fall within the remit of existing regulations on the protection of 
health and the environment.  These are areas of shared competence between the European Union 
(EU) and Member States, and so fracking is subject to regulation at multiple levels.  Government 
is satisfied that together EU and UK regulations cover fracking, and that, because the regulations 
are high in number and broad in scope, they can be regarded as adequate. 3   Consequently, 
Government has rejected proposals for new legislation on the basis that the UK already has ‘the 
most robust regulatory regime in the world for shale gas’.4  With the emphasis on the continuity 
of existing legislation, the UK has defended against reform for fear that additional rules for 
fracking would stifle technological development and industrial growth.  Describing the 
Government’s position, former Minister of State for Energy, Michael Fallon, stated: ‘we are 
absolutely opposed to further regulation in this particular area’.5   
 
 Contrast this with what I term ‘regulatory dexterity’, which involves the reverse.  Unlike 
‘domain’-type responses which defensively demarcate areas already covered by regulation, 
‘dexterity’ is prompted by concerns over the lack of specific legislation and the corresponding need 
for reform.  It prioritises the need to act quickly and with precision in adapting to changing 
technological circumstances.  Rather than viewing regulation in the abstract, ‘dexterity’ has a 
narrower focus on concrete legal rules.  In this case, Government singles out rules governing 
finance, planning permission, and access to land.  Within the confines of these rules, shale gas 
activities are seen not as analogous to, but as dissimilar from, conventional fossil fuel extraction.  
This opens up the possibility of fracking-specific regulation.  Finance, planning permission, and 
physical access, to the extent that they relate to the choice of energy provision, are areas of Member 
State competence in which the EU has no power to act – and so they involve the exercise of 
national jurisdiction.  Here, instead of giving blanket assurances of broad regulatory coverage, 
Government looks to specific problems of regulatory inadequacy and stresses the urgent need for 
regulatory change.  This has resulted in, inter alia, the introduction of new legislation, including 
                                                        
3 This article was written before the EU referendum.  The irony that the UK Government sees EU regulations as 
foundational in this context does not go unnoticed. 
4  DECC, ‘Shale Gas Health Review by Public Health England’ (31 October 2013) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/shale-gas-health-review-by-public-health-england accessed 13 November 
2015.  See also HC Deb 16 September 2015, vol 599, cols 35-37WS. 
5 Economic Affairs Committee, The Economic Impact on UK Energy Policy of Shale Gas and Oil: Oral and Written Evidence 
(HL 2013-14, 172) 163. 
measures to ensure that shale gas projects benefit from a streamlined planning permission process, 
generous tax breaks, and an automatic right of underground access.  The object, of course, is to 
attract investment in and stimulate the development of the UK’s fracking industry. 
 
 The article goes on to show that, although ‘regulatory domain’ and ‘regulatory dexterity’ 
are in many ways inconsistent (abstract/concrete, analogous/dissimilar, multilevel/national, 
continuity/change etc), they also sustain each other through their opposing forms.6  However 
much they appear to be contradictory, ‘domain’ and ‘dexterity’ work in close and strategic alliance.  
Both operate to the same end – the promotion of fracking – by resisting the imposition of 
technology-restricting legislative burdens (in defence of the ‘regulatory domain’) and by legislating 
to facilitate technological development (through the exercise of ‘regulatory dexterity’).  This means 
that the regulation of fracking is at any moment both fixed (‘domain’) and flexible (‘dexterity’), 
both general and specific, both rooted in the past and pointing towards a particular technological 
future.  Far from being a weakness, these multiple images of regulation shield it from criticism by 
giving Government considerable scope in interpreting the regulatory rules in ways that are 
conducive to increased shale gas production.  Arguments that law is too slow to respond to 
fracking are countered with examples of fast-acting regulatory dexterity; conversely, criticisms that 
new legislation has been rushed through are answered by recalling the stability of the regulatory 
domain.  It is not just that ‘domain’ and ‘dexterity’ present two opposing conceptions of regulation; 
it is that they are simultaneously and reciprocally used to achieve the same policy objective.  They 
contradict and they cohere.  This interaction merits further consideration. 
 
Policy Agenda 
                                                        
6 On the contradictory attributes of law, see P. Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modern Law (Routledge 1992); Patricia 
Ewick and Susan S. Silbey, The Common Place of Law: Stories from Everyday Life (University of Chicago Press 1998). 
This section outlines the complexities and uncertainties involved in regulating fracking.  Such 
issues are not unique to this case but are commonly encountered in any major technological 
development.7  Fracking, however, offers a particularly vivid and current example of how complex 
and contested understandings of technology are translated into material regulatory form.  Later 
the article presents two such modes of translation (‘regulatory domain’ and ‘regulatory dexterity’), 
each of which uses different blends of reasoning and discourse.  The purpose now is to show how 
the many claims and controversies surrounding fracking have yielded, counter-intuitively perhaps, 
an unambiguous Government policy in favour of the technology and of the large-scale production 
of shale gas. 
 
Shale gas is a natural gas trapped in shale rock deep underground.  It is described as 
‘unconventional’ because it was previously too difficult or uneconomic to extract, but recent 
advances in drilling technology, especially fracking, have made this more feasible.  Fracking works 
by injecting large volumes of fluid (water containing sand and additive chemicals) at high pressure 
into shale rock to create tiny fractures, allowing the gas to escape and be collected.  A well is drilled 
vertically and, on reaching the shale, is directed horizontally for up to several kilometres along the 
shale bed.8  One advantage over other types of drilling is that multiple horizontal wells can be 
‘fracked’ from a single vertical bore, allowing gas to be drawn from a wide area around the site 
while minimising the number of well pads needed at the surface.   
 
Other benefits are said to include the provision of a cheaper, cleaner, and more secure 
energy supply.  First, Government maintains that the extraction of ‘home-grown’ shale gas will 
protect the UK market from global price shocks and interruptions to supply from politically 
                                                        
7 eg S. Jasanoff, ‘Technologies of Humility’ (2007) 450(7166) Nature 33; B. Wynne, Rationality and Ritual: Participation 
and Exclusion in Nuclear Decision-Making (2nd edn, Earthscan 2011); Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Emerging 
Biotechnologies: Technology, Choice and the Public Good (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2012).  
8 For explanation, see M. Stephenson, Shale Gas and Fracking: The Science Behind the Controversy (Elsevier 2015) ch 3. 
unstable parts of the world.9  Secondly, it believes that an increase in domestic gas supplies will 
benefit ‘the whole of society’10 by providing ‘revenues, growth and jobs – and, of course, affordable 
bills’.11  Much has been made of how the development of a UK fracking industry will result in 
lower gas prices, as it has done in the US, and bring down energy costs for consumers.12  Thirdly, 
so long as it replaces coal, shale gas is expected to help the UK to achieve a significant reduction 
in greenhouse gas emissions, as required by law.13  Because gas-fired power generation emits less 
carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane than traditional coal-fired power plants,
14 shale gas is described 
as a ‘bridging fuel’15 to a greener energy future – at least until other energy sources (eg renewables, 
nuclear power) become more widely available.  Understandably, Government welcomes the 
prospect of a more consumer-friendly, resilient, and sustainable energy system, which is why shale 
gas production is described as an ‘urgent national priority’.16  
 
The supposed benefits of shale gas are not, however, universally accepted or known for 
certain.  Critics have pointed out that UK shale gas production may not have the desired market 
impact.17  This is because production costs in the UK are expected to be high, which will have to 
be factored into the price at which the gas is sold, and also because the UK may remain part of an 
integrated European gas market, meaning that any cost benefits from its shale gas development 
will be diluted.18  The dysfunctional nature of the UK energy market, on which the ‘big six’ energy 
                                                        
9 DECC, Single Departmental Plan 2015 to 2020 (DECC 2016) pt 1.1. 
10  Edward Davey, ‘The Myths and Realities of Shale Gas Exploration’ (9 September 2013) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-myths-and-realities-of-shale-gas-exploration accessed 3 September 
2015.  
11 ibid.  See also HC Deb 29 January 2014, col 862. 
12 Economic Affairs Committee, The Economic Impact on UK Energy Policy of Shale Gas and Oil (HL 2013-14, 172) ch 3. 
13 Climate Change Act 2008, s 1(1); Energy Act 2013, s 57. 
14 D.J.C. MacKay and T.J. Stone, Potential Greenhouse Gas Emissions Associated with Shale Gas Extraction and Use (DECC 
2013) 28.   
15 DECC, Shale Gas Made Simple (DECC 2014) 1. 
16 Economic Affairs Committee, Economic Impact on UK Energy Policy of Shale Gas (n 12) para 258. 
17 Energy and Climate Change Committee, Shale Gas (HC 2010-12, 795-I) 27; P. Stevens, Shale Gas in the United Kingdom 
(Chatham House 2013) 5; C. Huhne, ‘The Truth about David Cameron’s Fracking Fairytale’ The Guardian (London, 
26 January 2014).  
18 Economic Affairs Committee, Oral and Written Evidence (n 5) 149. 
providers have a stranglehold, further means that, even with a plentiful supply of domestic shale 
gas, a reduction in consumer prices is by no means guaranteed.19  Additionally, it is argued that the 
effect of shale gas production on total UK emissions is likely to be small.20  It is even suggested 
that global emissions of greenhouse gases could increase if the fossil fuels displaced by shale gas (eg 
coal or liquefied gas) are exported and burnt elsewhere.21  The issue is that ‘[t]he climate does not 
care where the CO2 comes from, whether it is from gas, from coal, from the UK or from China’.
22 
 
As well as having potentially long-term impacts on the climate, fracking also poses 
immediate and localised risks which are of significant public concern.  These include risks of 
groundwater contamination caused by the leakage of fracking fluids; surface spills of fuel or waste 
water; local air pollution from the on-site flaring of gas; increased traffic movement, noise, and 
dust; damage to neighbouring property from seismic activity; disturbance to natural habitats caused 
by construction and drilling; and visual intrusion into the local landscape by buildings and drilling 
rigs.23  Yet, there is considerable uncertainty as to the nature and scale of possible harms, which is 
attributed to the very limited amount of fracking to have taken place in the UK and a 
corresponding lack of data.  It is noted that, because only a few wells have been drilled (and only 
one has been ‘fracked’), there is ‘a risk that the data they reveal may not be representative’.24  
Consequently it is too soon to draw firm conclusions about the extent of the UK’s shale gas 
resources or their recoverability, making it difficult to assess the seriousness of the risks or the 
value of the benefits.   
 
                                                        
19 Office of Fair Trading, Ofgem and Competition and Markets Authority, State of the Market Assessment (Ofgem 2014) 
43-44. 
20 MacKay and Stone (n 14) 33. 
21 ibid 33-35. 
22 Energy and Climate Change Committee (n 17) Q75 (Professor Kevin Anderson). 
23 DECC, Fracking UK Shale: Planning Permission and Communities (DECC 2014) 4. 
24 British Geological Survey/DECC, The Carboniferous Bowland Shale Gas Study: Geology and Resource Estimation (DECC 
2013) 6. 
Uncertainties also flow from the ‘non-technical’ aspects of fracking, and there are 
unanswered questions of a more fundamental kind, regarding public attitudes towards shale gas 
and the UK’s energy mix generally.  Standard opinion surveys can be poor gauges of the range and 
complexity of public perception, as ‘people bring more to their understanding of “risk” than 
conventional technical approaches imply’.25  Attitudes depend on a range of factors such as cultural 
conditioning,26 social and political values, and levels of trust in decision-making individuals and 
institutions.27  For example, a public dialogue exercise found that participants with negative views 
of fracking were also those who felt that ‘the government had already taken a position on shale 
gas and oil at a national level if not locally’ and that ‘exploration would most likely go ahead 
regardless of public opposition’. 28   These additional layers of doubt have received little 
Government attention, except where they are seen as potential barriers to shale gas development 
– in which case they are viewed as temporary, practical inconveniences (‘when people start to see 
the benefit … they will see that it is quite right that this is part of our long-term economic plan’29) 
rather than more persistent and deep-seated issues requiring serious consideration.  As far as policy 
goes, they are ‘non-issues’.30 
     
Thus, although it raises a variety of different concerns, fracking is presented as a problem 
of unknown but knowable risks.  This places great emphasis on the need to proceed with fracking 
in order to close knowledge gaps and enable the more precise calculation likely outcomes.  Here, 
                                                        
25 B. Wynne, C. Waterton and R. Grove-White, Public Perceptions and the Nuclear Industry in West Cumbria (Lancaster 
University 2007) 4.   
26 See generally M. Douglas and A. Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technological and Environmental 
Dangers (University of California Press 1992). 
27 B. Wynne, ‘Misunderstood Misunderstanding: Social Identities and Public Uptake of Science’ (1992) 1(3) Public 
Understanding of Science 281, 295-297. 
28 Taylor Nelson Sofres, Public Engagement with Shale and Oil: A Report on Findings from Public Dialogue Workshops (Taylor 
Nelson Sofres 2014) 14-15. 
29  ‘David Cameron: Shale Gas Projects Will Benefit Communities Financially’ (The Telegraph, 13 January 2014) 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/energy/fracking/10568623/David-Cameron-shale-gas-projects-will-
benefit-communities-financially.html accessed 30 June 2016. 
30 See eg M.A. Crenson, The Un-Politics of Air Pollution: A Study of Non-Decisionmaking in the Cities (John Hopkins Press 
1971).  
uncertainty has considerable functional value in policy formation, involving what is described 
elsewhere as the ‘instrumental use of technical doubt’.31  Instead of propping up arguments against 
such development (as one might expect, in light of other policy encounters with ‘the precautionary 
principle’32), technical uncertainty becomes the reason for pressing ahead.  The question becomes 
‘when’ not ‘if’ fracking will happen – as indeed David Cameron explained:  ‘we’re going all out for 
shale’.33     
 
Clear Policy, Fractured Regulation 
The policy in this area leaves a great many issues unresolved, but it is unmistakably clear in its 
meaning and intent.  This is reflected in various Government initiatives and institutional 
arrangements, all designed to support shale gas development and fracking.  There is no space to 
discuss them in detail, but a handful of examples should illustrate the point.  The Department for 
Communities and Local Government (DCLG), for instance, has published guidance on how 
fracking sites should proceed through the local planning process,34 and pledged financial assistance 
to local planning authorities dealing with shale gas applications.35  In his 2013 Budget speech, the 
Chancellor, George Osborne, announced a new fiscal regime for shale gas operators, as well as a 
benefits scheme for communities hosting shale gas projects.36  This will be overseen by the recently 
established Office of Unconventional Gas and Oil, which sits within the Department of Energy 
and Climate Change (DECC) and which is generally responsible for encouraging the recovery of 
                                                        
31 M. Bloor et al, ‘The Instrumental Use of Technical Doubts: Technological Controversies, Investment Decisions 
and Air Pollution Controls in the Global Shipping Industry’ (2014) 41(2) Science and Public Policy 234.   
32 Friends of the Earth Cymru, Planning and Unconventional Oil and Gas Fighting Off Fracking in Cymru/Wales (Friends of 
the Earth Cymru 2014).   
33 Prime Minister’s Office, ‘Local Councils to Receive Millions in Business Rates from Shale Gas Developments’ (13 
January 2014) https://www.gov.uk/government/news/local-councils-to-receive-millions-in-business-rates-from-
shale-gas-developments accessed 30 June 2016.  
34 Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), Planning Practice Guidance for Onshore Oil and Gas 
(DCLG 2013). 
35 DCLG, Shale Exploration – Support for Mineral Planning Authorities (DCLG 2015). 
36 HM Treasury, Budget 2013 (HC 2012-13, 1033) 4. 
the UK’s unconventional oil and gas reserves.37  Together these policy-institutionalised responses 
give the impression of coherence (even if their rationale remains contentious) and create a single 
narrative about the need to pursue fracking.38 
 
But whereas fracking emerges from the policy discourse as a unitary ‘thing’ – a singularly 
good ‘thing’ – its regulation involves multiple, sometimes conflicting, frames of meaning.39  A close 
look at the regulatory rules and their application reveals several points of divergence, owing to 
Government’s simultaneous use of different styles of reasoning and interpretation.40  These can 
be grouped into two main schemas: first, ‘regulatory domain’, which combines interpretive 
strategies of abstraction, analogy, coverage, continuity, and resistance to reform; and secondly, 
‘regulatory dexterity’, which lays emphasis on concreteness, dissimilarity, inadequacy, change, and 
new legislation.  The remainder of the article examines the origins and influence of this fracturing 
(for want of a better word!) of regulatory approach. 
 
Regulatory Domain 
Regulation in the Abstract 
In his book Seeing Like a State, James C. Scott examines various state attempts to make society 
orderly and legible by ‘seeing’ human activity through ‘simplified approximations of documents 
and statistics’.41  Such ‘simplification’ requires the state to take ‘an aggregate, synoptic view of … 
                                                        
37  HM Government, ‘Office of Unconventional Gas and Oil (OUGO)’ 
https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/office-of-unconventional-gas-and-oil-ougo accessed 26 July 2015. 
38 See generally J. Pinch and W.E. Bijker, ‘The Social Construction of Facts and Artefacts: Or How the Sociology of 
Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each Other’ (1984) 14(3) Social Studies of Science 399. 
39 S. Jasanoff, Science and Public Reason (Earthscan 2012) 43.  See also C. Hilson, ‘Framing Fracking: Which Frames Are 
Heard in English Planning and Environmental Policy and Practice?’ (2015) 27(2) Journal of Environmental Law 177. 
40 On ‘discursive variability and rhetorical maneuvering’, see Ewick and Silbey (n 6) 51.  See also O.W. Pedersen, ‘The 
Rhetoric of Environmental Reasoning and Responses as Applied to Fracking’ (2015) 27(2) Journal of Environmental Law 
325. 
41 J.C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (Yale University Press 
1998) 76. 
reality’42 so that facts ‘lose their particularity and reappear in schematic or simplified form’.43  Scott 
considers this a necessary part of modern statecraft and describes how the ‘view from above’ 
results in ‘abridged maps’ of legibility, which do not accurately represent the activity of society but 
rather represent ‘only that slice of it that interested the official observer’.44  Although Scott does 
not engage directly with formal state regulation, his conceptualisation of the disciplining of 
knowledge under the government’s gaze offers a useful way of thinking about UK regulatory 
responses to fracking.  I am interested here in how knowledge about regulation in the context of 
fracking has been ‘mapped’, recounted, and generalised.  Taking inspiration from Scott’s work, I 
develop the notion of the ‘regulatory domain’. 
 
 A good place to start is with DECC’s Regulatory Roadmap for onshore oil and gas 
exploration, which quite literally gives a visual representation of order – in this case regulatory 
order – in the form of a flow chart.  The Roadmap is aimed at current and prospective operators of 
unconventional oil and gas sites, especially shale gas sites, and it presents a step by step guide to 
compliance with the relevant regulatory requirements.  DECC describes it as ‘a first point of 
reference for anyone seeking to understand the permitting and permissions process’ and as 
providing ‘a basic, indicative overview of the process, highlighting key pieces of legislation and 
regulation, and identifying required actions and best practices and various stages’.45  The neatly 
arranged and colour-coordinated chart illustrates the main regulatory phases, in order of 
application: (i) regulations overseen by central government; (ii) the planning process; (iii) the 
environmental process; and (iv) regulations within the remit of other public bodies.  This schematic 
illustration makes the regulation more understandable (akin to what Scott describes as ‘projects of 
                                                        
42 ibid 11. 
43 ibid 81. 
44 ibid 3. 
45  DECC, Onshore Oil and Gas Exploration in the UK: Regulation and Best Practice 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/regulatory-roadmap-onshore-oil-and-gas-exploration-in-the-uk-
regulation-and-best-practice accessed 11 August 2015. 
legibility’46) and it also, inevitably, invites generalisations about the regulatory regime as a whole.  
Indeed, the totalising image of fracking regulation conveys completeness and control, even though 
it does not reflect the finer points of law in this area – after all, it would defeat the purpose of the 
Regulatory Roadmap to detail every aspect of the regulation.  As Scott reminds us, a map is designed 
to abstract and summarise.  In fact, the completeness of a map, he says, ‘depends, in a curious way, 
on its abstract sketchiness, its lack of detail – its thinness’.47 
 
 The visual representation of regulation in abstract form is one way in which the regulatory 
domain is set out, but there are additional interpretive techniques – or ‘knowledge moves’48 – used 
by Government in arguing that existing legislation applies to fracking.  They are as follows. 
 
Regulation by Analogy 
Government’s claim that fracking is subject to robust regulation depends, at least in part, on its 
depiction of fracking as analogous to ‘conventional’ methods of oil and gas extraction.  It sees 
fracking as new, but not so new that additional regulatory provision is required.  ‘Newness’ is at 
the core of technological innovation but, with a few notable exceptions,49 its significance for 
regulation is rarely mentioned.  The general literature on technology distinguishes between two 
broad types of innovation: ‘incremental’ and ‘radical’.  The former is characterised by a ‘natural 
trajectory’ 50  of successive improvements on existing products or processes, while the latter 
involves ‘breakthrough’ technologies that are transformational in terms of their attributes or 
                                                        
46 Scott (n 40) 80. 
47 ibid 44, my emphasis.  See also C.M. Rose, Property and Persuasion: Essays on the History, Theory and Rhetoric of Ownership 
(Westview Press 1994) 278. 
48 M. Valverde, ‘Theoretical and Methodological Issues in the Study of Legal Knowledge Practices’, in A. Sarat, L. 
Douglas and M.M. Umphrey (eds) How Law Knows (Stanford University Press 2007) ch 3, 83.   
49 See eg D.D. Friedman, ‘Does Technology Require New Law?’ (2001) 25(1) Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 71; 
J. Black, M. Lodge and M. Thatcher (eds) Regulatory Innovation: A Comparative Analysis (Edward Elgar 2005) ch 1; M. 
Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs: Law and Decision Making for a New Technology (Edward Elgar 2008) esp 72-73; C. Ford, 
‘Innovation-Framing Regulation’ (2013) 649(1) Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 76. 
50 R.R. Nelson and S.G. Winter, ‘In Search of a Useful Theory of Innovation’ (1977) 6 Research Policy 36, 57.   
effects or both.51  Of course, in defining a particular innovation, much depends on who is doing 
the classifying and in what context, because development that is groundbreaking to engineers may 
be unremarkable as far as policymakers are concerned, and vice versa.52  In policymaking, the 
perception of a technology as ‘radically’ or ‘incrementally’ innovative will inevitably shape the way 
in which responses are formed.  In the case of fracking, even though the terms ‘radical’ or 
‘incremental’ are not used, its perceived novelty (or familiarity) is crucial to determining the 
regulatory response. 
 
Government contends that because fracking is broadly comparable to what has gone 
before, it can be regulated under existing legislative regimes.  One basis for comparison is the 
technological process.  In this context, fracking is regarded as the latest variation on long-
established drilling techniques; it is represented not as a revolutionary change but as a minor 
increment in technological innovation that hardly needs to be considered separately for the 
purpose of regulation.53  For example, the Environment Agency (the principal environmental 
regulator in England) describes fracking as ‘an established technology’,54 and Government is at 
pains to emphasise that fracking has already been used in the UK (albeit offshore rather than on 
land).55  The analogy is also pursued in relation to risk.  Government argues that the categories of 
risk associated with fracking are not unique and apply to any one of a number of techniques used 
to exploit fossil fuel reserves – the implication being that regulators are already equipped to deal 
with them.  Government puts considerable importance on the fact that the UK has a ‘strong track 
                                                        
51  R. Garcia and R. Calantone, ‘A Critical Look at Technological Innovation Typology and Innovativeness 
Terminology: A Literature Review’ (2002) 19 Journal of Product Innovation Management 110, 113. 
52 W.J. Abernathy and K.B. Clark ‘Innovation: Mapping the Winds of Creative Destruction’ (1985) 14(1) Research Policy 
3, 4. 
53 cf S. Jasanoff, ‘In the Democracies of DNA: Ontological Uncertainty and Political Order in Three States’ (2005) 
24(2) New Genetics and Society 139, 139.  
54 Environment Agency site has been archived but is cited in E. White et al, Briefing Paper: Shale Gas and Fracking (Paper 
No. SN06073, House of Commons Library 2015) 25. 
55 Edward Davey (n 10).  
record’ 56  and ‘over 50 years of experience of regulating the onshore oil and gas industry 
nationally’.57  And since the techniques used in fracking for shale gas are ‘broadly similar to those 
used in existing onshore gas and oil extraction methods’, it follows that fracking ‘will be covered 
by the same robust safety and environmental regulatory regime’.58   
 
Broad, Multilevel Regulatory Coverage 
Government claims that existing regulatory measures cover fracking despite not having been 
designed for such purpose.  In doing so, it makes four types of argument.  The first relates to the 
quantity of applicable measures.  Fracking cannot be described as unregulated as it comes within 
the scope of a large number of legislative regimes on public health, workplace safety, and the 
environment.  These are areas of shared competence between the EU and Member States,59 
resulting in a complex of interrelated rules and procedures across different regulatory areas and 
jurisdictional levels.  Decisions concerning national energy provision remain the prerogative of 
Member States,60 which is why the UK has been able unilaterally to enact legislation governing the 
exploration and production of fossil fuels.61  On top of this, numerous measures of EU legislation 
(36 according to one estimate62) are relevant to the health and environmental aspects of fracking, 
even though they contain no mention of either ‘fracking’ or ‘shale gas’.  Government is keen to 
point out that all drilling operations, whether or not they involve fracking, ‘must comply with a 
comprehensive set of health and safety regulations’.63   
 
                                                        
56  DECC, ‘Press Release: New Onshore Licensing Round Opens’ (28 July 2014) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-onshore-licensing-round-opens accessed 1 July 2016. 
57 DECC, Developing Onshore Shale Gas and Oil – Facts about ‘Fracking’ (DECC 2013) 8. 
58 DECC, Fracking UK Shale (n 23) 2. 
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 The second argument concerns the definitional breadth of the relevant regulations.  It is 
important that the regulations are of general application, in that they do not address a particular 
technology or distinguish between different fossil fuels.  For instance, a prospective operator must 
apply for and obtain a Petroleum Exploration and Development Licence from DECC before it 
can search for and extract ‘petroleum’.64  The definition of ‘petroleum’ is clearly wide enough to 
encompass shale gas as it includes ‘any mineral oil or relative hydrocarbon and natural gas existing 
in its natural condition in strata’.65  A further example can be found in planning law.  Before 
carrying out ‘development’, the operator requires planning permission from the minerals planning 
authority (a unit of the local authority).  Since ‘development’ is defined as including ‘mining or 
other operations in, on, over or under land’,66 it is sufficiently broad to cover fracking – and 
because no distinction is drawn between the various kinds of ‘mining or other operations’, the 
requirement of planning permission is taken to apply to fracking as it does to any other method 
of drilling.67   
 
To give the planning authority a more detailed account of the likely environmental effects, 
the operator may be required to complete an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of the 
proposed development before planning permission will be granted.  For some types of 
development under the EIA Directive68 an EIA is mandatory (Annex I projects), whereas for 
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Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2011; Town and Country Planning 
others the planning authority must first determine whether the proposed development is likely to 
have significant environmental effects, bearing in mind the development’s nature, size, and 
location (Annex II projects).69  Neither of the Annexes makes reference to ‘fracking’, but they do 
list broad categories of activity into which fracking could fall.  Annex I, for example, includes the 
category ‘extraction of petroleum and natural gas for commercial purposes’,70 and Annex II lists 
projects in the ‘extractive industry’, including those involving ‘deep drilling’ – which can reasonably 
be regarded as covering fracking, even though the categories do not say so.  It is because of their 
definitional breadth that fracking is assumed to come within their purview; hence there is no 
question of shortcomings or gaps in the law. 
 
 The third argument is that existing regulations cover the entire life cycle of fracking 
operations.  General planning policy, for example, dictates that planning permission is required 
not just for the full-scale production of onshore oil and gas but also for the initial exploration and 
appraisal phases of development.71  Planning policy is overlaid by legislation addressing a range of 
concerns from the design and construction of wells,72 to the flaring of gas.73  Over the course of 
the fracking project, the operator also has to obtain a number of environmental permits from the 
Environment Agency.74  A permit is needed for any of the regulated activities contained in the 
legislation.75  As one might expect, fracking is not specified but would come within the terms of 
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several classes of activity at different stages of the process – including ‘a groundwater activity’ 
(where there is a risk of discharges into groundwater) and a ‘water discharge activity’ (if surface 
water run-off becomes polluted, eg due to a spill of flowback fluid) during drilling operations, and 
‘a mining waste activity’ at the point of waste disposal.76 
 
The fourth, related argument is that existing regulations also deal with a host of different 
sectoral concerns.  Alongside the corpus of environmental legislation are various measures on 
occupational health and safety.  These require an operator, for example, to adopt safe working 
practices for all ‘borehole operations’77 – including drilling for petroleum (again, broadly defined 
as ‘any mineral oil or relative hydrocarbon and natural gas’78).  Prior to drilling, the operator must 
notify the Health and Safety Executive of any hazards, monitoring arrangements and details of the 
well design to show that it will ‘so far as is reasonably practicable be safe’.79  This applies regardless 
of whether the applicant proposes to drill for conventional or unconventional oil or gas.  EU 
chemicals legislation is also relevant to on-site safety management, even though it does not 
explicitly deal with fracking.80  For instance, an operator in receipt of chemicals used in fracking 
fluids would fall within the meaning of a ‘downstream user’81 and therefore be obliged to take 
appropriate steps to ensure that any risks are properly controlled.82  Together, the many legislative 
regimes across a range of sectors set the bounds of the ‘regulatory domain’.  It is because these 
regimes are technology-neutral,83 and are geared to such broad categories of subject (eg chemicals, 
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petroleum operations, polluting activities) and object (eg safety), that the regulatory domain is so 
expansive. 
 
Regulatory Continuity 
Clearly, there is no shortage of regulation in this area and the breadth of legislative coverage is 
vast.  And given that fracking is seen as functionally equivalent to conventional drilling techniques, 
there is no break in regulatory continuity.  The idea that existing regulation will continue to apply 
also rests on the argument that the regulation is well-suited to the task of coping with technological 
advance.  What is interesting is that the policy preoccupation with regulatory coverage has a 
tendency to produce conclusions of regulatory adequacy.  For instance, the former Secretary of 
State for Energy and Climate Change stressed that ‘[w]e have the regulations, controls and powers 
of the Environment Agency, the regulations, controls and powers of the Health and Safety 
Executive and the regulations, controls and powers of my own Department, so we already have a 
strong regulatory regime’.84  That is to say, that since the regulations are extensive, they must be held 
to be efficacious.   
 
No account is taken of the conditions attaching to the various licences and permissions 
needed for fracking, or of the suitability of specific regulatory requirements given their 
interpretation and enforcement in practice (eg how do operators ensure that fracking is ‘safe’ and 
take ‘appropriate steps to control risks’?).  It is enough that the conditions and requirements apply; 
whether or not they are appropriate for regulating fracking remains largely undiscussed.  Such 
deference to existing rules and suppositions of efficacy is, to some degree, built into the regulatory 
structure.  For example, in the planning system, minerals planning authorities are instructed to 
‘assume that the regulatory regime is appropriate and will operate effectively’.85  Similarly, a review 
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of the potential health impacts of shale gas extraction by Public Health England (a division of the 
Department of Health), was written on the basis that the operations are ‘properly run and 
regulated’.86  The effect is to reinforce the idea of the regulatory domain, and to show a preference 
for tracing the contours of the regulations instead of subjecting them to a more penetrating 
analysis.  And as ‘coverage’ is treated as the primary indicator of appropriateness in matters of 
health, safety, and the environment, it seems legitimate to infer that existing regulations make 
ample provision for fracking – even if fracking is not expressly provided for by statute.  The 
regulations appear as a gapless, timeless set of rules, not unlike the view associated with legal 
formalism, in that the standards enacted in legislation form a seamless whole and can be 
mechanically applied to any factual situation.87  The lack of specific regulation is of little practical 
significance because fracking ‘is covered through lots of our existing legislation’.88   
 
The repeated emphasis on coverage further means that policymakers have generally been 
dismissive of the idea of amendment.  One example of this comes from the time when the Water 
Bill (now the Water Act 2014) was going through Parliament.  A new clause was inserted into the 
Bill to introduce a liability guarantee to ensure that fracking companies have funds to pay for clean-
up in the event of a polluting accident.89   The Member of Parliament who tabled the amendment 
explained that such a provision was needed because, under existing regulatory arrangements, ‘even 
if liability for an accident can be proven, there remains a risk that fracking companies will go 
bankrupt, leaving taxpayers or water companies with a cost’.90  This is in contradiction with 
‘domain’-based arguments, which hold that there is no need for fracking-specific legislation since 
existing regulation is adequate.  But while the proposed amendment shows that not everyone is 
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convinced by assumptions of regulatory adequacy, the response of Government provides yet 
further evidence of the ‘domain’ at work.  Government did not support the amendment, and had 
it removed from the Bill, because it believed that the ‘existing regulatory framework is fit for 
purpose for the exploration and exploitation of onshore oil and gas activities’. 91   The then-
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs explained that 
‘a great number of checks and controls’ already exist to ‘ensure that operators comply with the 
requirements of their permits and deal with the wider pollution risks without adding to existing 
legislation’.92   
 
The practice of resorting to existing legislative coverage gives the ‘regulatory domain’ a 
sturdiness and panacea-like quality, and leaves little scope for reform in areas where ‘domain’-like 
arguments are invoked (ie health, safety, and the environment).  This is reflected in the words of 
the Prime Minister, who insists that ‘[w]e have a very tough set of environmental permissions, 
permits and all the rest of it.  I do not think we need to add to that’.93  Yet, not all stakeholders 
accept so uncritically the appropriateness of existing regulations or the paramountcy of the 
‘regulatory domain’, hence Government has been put on the defensive.   
 
Defending Against Reform 
The UK Government has maintained its position on regulatory coverage, even in the face of 
determined opposition.  In other jurisdictions, policymakers have been less inclined to look only 
to the formal reach of regulation and more willing to engage in the sort of ‘adequacy testing’ that 
the UK has so far avoided.  The EU institutions, for instance, have made a more concerted effort 
to probe into whether existing provisions offer effective protection against fracking-related risks.  
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The European Commission finds that, although EU legislation is prima facie applicable to 
fracking, ‘the interpretation of applicable EU legislation is unclear, while other environmental 
problems remain unaddressed’.94  Here we see a clear separation of questions of coverage and 
adequacy, and a reluctance on the part of the Commission to treat them as one and the same issue.  
A similar line of reasoning is followed by the European Parliament, which notes that, 
notwithstanding the many relevant regulations, it is ‘unclear whether the current regulatory 
framework of EU legislation provides an adequate guarantee against the risks … resulting from 
shale gas activities’.95   
 
The European Parliament (particularly its Committee on Environment, Public Health and 
Food Safety) is especially concerned that even though fracking comes within the definitional scope 
of many pieces of EU legislation, it may fail to trigger specific obligations in certain Directives and 
Regulations.  The Committee illustrated the problem with reference to the EIA (Environmental 
Impact Assessment) Directive.  Recall that an EIA must be completed for drilling activities if 
certain criteria are met: under Annex I if the project involves the extraction of more than 500,000 
cubic metres of gas per day;96 or under Annex II if the project involves deep drilling and is likely 
to have significant effects on the environment, and is either larger than one hectare or located in 
a protected area (such as an area of outstanding natural beauty).97  The trouble is that it is not 
obvious that fracking projects would fulfill these criteria as a matter of course.  As regards Annex 
I, shale gas drilling may have little trouble crossing the 500,000 cubic metres per day threshold 
during stages of full-scale commercial production, but will probably fail to yield such volumes of 
                                                        
94 Commission, ‘The Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons (Such as Shale Gas) Using High Volume Hydraulic 
Fracturing in the EU’ (Communication) COM (2014) 23 final/2, 27. 
95 European Parliament, ‘Environmental Impacts of Shale Gas and Shale Oil Extraction Activities’ (Resolution) 
P7_TA(2012)0443, para 60. 
96 ibid Annex I, para 14. 
97 ibid art 4(2)(b).  For explanation, see A. Ryall, Effective Judicial Protection and the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 
in Ireland (Hart 2009) 127-130. 
gas during the exploration phase – and even so, site operators will not know the rate of productivity 
at the outset.  The difficulty with Annex II (as transposed in the UK98) is that, provided the project 
is not located in a protected area, the operator can avoid having to conduct an EIA by proposing 
works of one hectare or less.  This is evident in a number of examples in the UK, where planning 
applications have been made for sites of up to 0.99 hectares in size.99  
 
The European Parliament has said it finds it highly unsatisfactory that fracking sites ‘are 
not generally subject to an environmental impact assessment despite the environmental risks of such 
projects’.100    So, when the EIA Directive was reviewed in 2012, the Parliament sought to introduce 
a requirement that an EIA should be conducted for all shale gas activities involving fracking.101  
That requirement does not, however, feature in the final version of the Directive, owing to the 
tactics of a handful of Member States including the UK.  Parties to the legislative process were 
keen to secure a quick agreement by the last plenary session (April 2014) before the European 
Parliamentary elections (May 2014).  To save time, the European Parliament postponed the 
completion of its first reading and instead entered into informal discussions with the European 
Council.  At the Council, the UK strenuously opposed the introduction of a mandatory EIA and 
reportedly played ‘a leading part’102 in the backlash, forming a blocking minority to prevent the 
adoption of Parliament’s more stringent proposals on shale gas.103  This proved successful, and 
the requirement of a mandatory EIA for fracking activities was removed before the revised 
Directive was agreed upon.  
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 From this, we see how arguments of broad regulatory coverage are relied on in defence of 
the regulatory domain.  The UK Government (and indeed any Member State) could, if it wished, 
introduce further requirements for shale gas, above and beyond those contained in the EIA 
Directive.104  But it chose instead to use its voting leverage to prevent any such intervention at EU 
level, and to ensure that the ‘regulatory domain’ remained unchanged.  Indeed, Government 
regards it as a victory in its ‘fight against unnecessary regulation … from Brussels’105 that the shale 
gas-specific amendment was not passed into law.106  Government’s first ‘Cut EU Red Tape’ report 
listed 30 priorities, one of which was to ensure that the EU would ‘[r]efrain from bringing forward 
legislative proposals on shale gas’.107  The reasons given are familiar: the Directive already covers 
fracking, and the current regulatory framework is ‘tried and tested’ and ‘well understood by 
businesses’. 108   This was echoed by former Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government, Eric Pickles, who commented that ‘given the UK’s long-standing domestic 
environmental safeguards, there really is no need for European legislation in this area’.109  The fact 
that the UK was able to resist reform shows just how steadfastly Government has set its face 
against legislative change, particularly EU legislative change, in this context.   
 
To summarise, the broad, multilevel coverage provided by EU and UK regulations is just 
one factor in establishing the ‘regulatory domain’.  Others include the use of regulatory abstraction 
and technological analogy, all of which help to give the ‘domain’ both conceptual form (ie as 
complete and comprehensive) and normative force (ie by offering resistance to reform).  None of 
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these factors or framings is inevitable – they involve strategic choices, interpretive discretion and 
what sociologists call ‘boundary work’.110 
 
Regulatory Dexterity 
So far, the article has looked at how UK policy on the regulation of fracking is the product of 
Government’s single-minded commitment to the existing regulatory domain and the coverage it 
affords.  Such a focus on coverage has meant that the policy contains little discussion of either the 
suitability of existing regulations or the manner of their implementation.  As a result, Government 
has shown an unwillingness to consider proposals for legislative reform tabled by UK policy 
actors111 or EU institutions.112  The remainder of the article addresses a subtle but important 
variation in Government’s approach – one that is at odds with the arguments heard so far.   
 
Although Government’s arguments about regulatory coverage dominate, limited 
exceptions have been carved out of the domain and set aside for regulatory amendment.  Here, 
Government has singled out parts of the regulatory domain as defective and in need of reform – 
which is in direct contrast with its unquestioning acceptance of the coverage (and hence adequacy) 
of existing regulatory arrangements.  These regulatory ‘outliers’ are important because they tell a 
different story.  Instead of portraying existing regulations as applicable and robust, Government 
has moved swiftly to introduce new regulatory measures for fracking, including new items of 
legislation.  So while the ‘regulatory domain’ gives a sense of fixedness, immutability, and 
abstraction, the approach described now involves greater agility, quick reflexes, and a higher level 
of precision – hence the term ‘regulatory dexterity’.  And whereas the domain rests on techniques 
of mapping and analogy, and so on, dexterity is driven by its own logics of interpretation, each 
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giving force to the idea that the law needs updating.  These dexterity-producing interpretations 
will now be examined as isolated departures from the prevailing image of the regulatory domain.  
They place great emphasis on technological dissimilarity (not analogy), concrete legal rules (not 
regulation in the abstract), specific regulatory adequacies (not broad regulatory coverage), and 
changes to national legislation (not an insistence on the continuity and comprehensiveness of 
multilevel regulatory regimes). 
 
Technological Dissimilarity  
We saw above that one reason for thinking that fracking is adequately dealt with by existing 
regulations is that it is considered to be analogous to established methods of drilling.  There are 
cases, however, in which that analogy is turned on its head and Government’s focus is on the 
differences between fracking and other drilling operations.  Unlike arguments that fracking is 
functionally equivalent to ‘conventional’ processes of extraction, the emphasis here is on the 
market-transforming potential of a new supply of shale gas. 113   Whereas, in establishing the 
‘regulatory domain’, Government concentrates on the similarities between fracking and 
conventional drilling in terms of technological process and categories of risk, arguments of 
‘regulatory dexterity’ are made on the basis that fracking has a substantially different end product, 
and offers new and remarkable benefits compared with traditional gas production.   
 
The distinction between technological processes and products applies in several areas of 
law to varying effect.114  In the context of fracking, it is strategically deployed to sustain claims of 
both ‘domain’ and ‘dexterity’.  Fracking may be an ‘incrementally’ innovative process (which 
continues to be regulated by existing legislation) but can result in a ‘radically’ innovative product 
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(which requires new regulation).115  As a technological product, shale gas is described as ‘an exciting 
new resource’,116 ‘an exciting new prospect for diversifying our energy supplies’,117 and ‘alternative’ 
to other fossil fuels.118  It is also distinguished in terms of its market impact, as it is said to have 
‘the potential to kickstart a whole new industry’.119  Government lays particular stress on the ‘new’ 
benefits of shale gas, setting it apart from conventional energy sources.  The greater the perceived 
differences, the easier it is to justify a new regulatory approach.  A further distinction is drawn in 
respect of costs, since fracking is expected to involve a high initial outlay and longer periods of 
unprofitability than conventional onshore and even offshore oil and gas projects.120  All of these 
distinguishing features (new product, new benefits, new costs) help to separate shale gas fracking 
from other types of extractive activity for regulatory purposes, and it is by creating some 
conceptual distance that the prospect of fracking-specific reform begins to materialise.    
 
Concrete Legal Rules and their Inadequacies 
As well as focusing on technological difference, Government provides concrete examples of 
inadequacies in existing regulation.  Instead of viewing the regulation as an integrated, complete 
whole, Government now points to individual points of regulatory weakness.  This is in stark 
contrast with its approach under the ‘regulatory domain’.  Rather than evaluate the regulations in 
terms of their broad, multilevel coverage, Government now focuses on whether specific parts of 
the regulation interfere with the UK’s development of fracking.  This involves singling out 
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particular rules and regulations that raise obstacles to such development.  Certain regulatory 
procedures are regarded as unnecessarily cumbersome and as imposing an unreasonable restraints 
on the shale gas industry.121  Life peer and former Chancellor, Lord Lawson, asks: 
 
is it not shameful that so far there has been only one exploratory well drilled in this 
country and that the industry is clear that the reason for the snail’s pace of progress is 
the mind-boggling bureaucratic complexity of the regulatory system in this country?122 
 
 Specific aspects of the regulatory system to attract Government criticism include the 
planning regime, which is apparently susceptible to ‘slow and confused decision making amongst 
councils’.123  In a joint statement, DECC and DCLG cautioned that ‘[i]f planning applications for 
shale exploration developments take months or even years it can create uncertainty for 
communities and prevent the development of a potentially vital national industry’.124  The law on 
access to land has also been criticised for imposing unduly burdensome obligations on fracking 
companies and creating a disincentive to investment in shale gas projects in the UK.  Until recently, 
land access in this context was governed by trespass law.  In order to avoid committing an 
actionable trespass, a company wishing to drill beneath land belonging to another first had to seek 
permission from the landowner or tenant.125  As fracking involves horizontal drilling for several 
hundreds if not thousands of metres, the company might have needed the agreement of a large 
number of individuals.  Government felt that it would be impractical to have to identify all relevant 
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landholders, noting that this ‘can require significant time and resources’,126 especially in cases 
involving land with unregistered title.  Moreover, under trespass law, a single landholder was able 
to obstruct fracking development simply by withholding permission.  Where a landholder 
unreasonably refused to grant access or demanded unreasonable terms for its grant, the shale gas 
company may have been entitled to apply to the court for the compulsory acquisition of ancillary 
rights over (or under) land pursuant to the Mines (Working Facilities and Support) Act 1966.127  
This is known to be a lengthy and costly process, however, and so Government did not want gas 
companies routinely having to resort to the 1966 Act.128 
 
To overcome problems of uncertainty, expense, and delay, Government has adopted 
several new initiatives to expedite the regulatory process for shale gas operations.  These include 
guidance for minerals planning authorities on how shale gas applications should proceed through 
the planning system,129 and policies giving the Secretary of State the additional power to ‘call-in’ a 
planning application and ‘recover’ a planning appeal for his own determination.130  The use of 
revisable guidance and standards of practice ensures that the content of existing regulation remains 
the same but its application is updated to reflect the changing technological circumstances.  In this 
regard, ‘regulatory dexterity’ has a role to play in preserving the stability of ‘regulatory domain’ – 
by leaving the substantive rules untouched and making new arrangements for implementation.  
 
‘Dexterity’ has also been used, however, to replace certain substantive rules entirely.  
Government has enacted new legislation in areas of finance, planning permission, and land access, 
with the aim of removing obstacles to shale gas development.  It is vital to note that the previous 
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law in these areas would have covered fracking – it is not as though Government was seeking to 
fill gaps in legal provision.  For example, the Mines (Working Facilities and Support) Act 1966 
already offered a regime whereby operators could gain access to, or under, the land of another.  
Likewise, the planning system already dealt with applications for development involving the 
onshore extraction of oil and gas – remember that the UK has ‘a strong track record’ and ‘over 50 
years of experience’ behind it.131  Similarly, oil and gas development was already subject to several 
types of tax.132  Government could conceivably have regarded these measures as coming within 
the ‘regulatory domain’ and as continuing to apply without modification.  On the issue of fracking, 
however, it construes existing regulation on finance, planning permission, and land access as both 
inadequate and requiring a complete overhaul.  The UK is, of course, free to legislate in these areas 
because EU Member States retain competence to determine their own national energy mix.133  In 
the following examples, the UK has used its national competence to introduce technology-specific 
legislation to increase the speed and scale at which fracking takes place.  They are, in other words, 
illustrations of ‘regulatory dexterity’ in action. 
 
New Fracking-Specific Legislation 
The first example of ‘regulatory dexterity’ is the newly established tax regime for shale gas activities, 
described by the Chancellor as ‘the most generous for shale in the world’.134  The Finance Act 2014 
introduces an ‘onshore allowance’ to support the development of shale gas projects that are 
economic but not commercially viable under the usual tax arrangements.135  Prior to the Act, 
profits from oil and gas extraction were taxed at a rate of 62% (30% corporation tax plus a 32% 
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supplementary charge).  The new onshore allowance exempts a portion of those profits from the 
supplementary charge, resulting in an effective tax rate of just 30%.136  The Finance Act 2014 also 
extends the ring fence expenditure supplement to protect companies embarking on shale gas 
projects from high start-up costs and an initial period of likely unprofitability.  Previously, the 
supplement allowed onshore oil and gas companies to uplift their losses by 10% for up to six 
accounting periods, in order to maintain their value until they could be offset against future 
profits.137  The Act extends the number of claims available to onshore oil and gas companies to 
ten accounting periods, allowing them to maintain the value of their losses for longer. 138  
Furthermore, new Business Rates Retention legislation in England means that local authorities will 
be able to keep 100% (rather than the standard 50%) of the business rates collected from shale oil 
and gas sites.139  Such fiscal measures aim to make the UK ‘an attractive, competitive opportunity 
for global operators’140 and to create the right economic conditions for the shale industry to 
flourish. 
 
 Secondly, Government hastily introduced two instruments of secondary legislation to 
lessen the burden of the planning process.  The first of these removes the obligation on fracking 
operators to notify individual owners or tenants to whose land the planning application relates.141  
The second effectively reduces the planning application fee for development involving fracking.142  
In its race to introduce these changes, however, Government allowed only limited opportunity for 
Parliamentary scrutiny.  Although the statutory instruments were subject to different procedural 
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requirements,143 neither received the level or quality of scrutiny that could reasonably have been 
expected.144  The Consultation Principles at that time stated that, while there is ‘no set formula’ for 
establishing the right length of a consultation, ‘[f]or a new and contentious policy, 12 weeks or 
more may still be appropriate’.145  In this case, the statutory instruments were out for consultation 
for only half that time.  The House of Lords’ Secondary Legislative Scrutiny Committee noted that 
fracking ‘might very well be seen as a new and contentious policy’ and found it ‘hard to imagine 
what policy considerations [if not fracking] might lead them to allow 12 weeks or longer for a 
consultation’.146  The timing of events also meant that the first instrument was not debated in 
Parliament,147 which was not technically a breach of procedural requirements, but the House of 
Lords’ Committee nevertheless found it ‘regrettable that the opportunity for Parliamentary 
scrutiny was curtailed in this way’. 148   Moreover, there was no regulatory impact assessment 
accompanying the second instrument when it was laid before Parliament,149 leading the House of 
Lords’ Committee to conclude that it was ‘not persuaded that the Department [for Communities 
and Local Government] has adequately thought through its policy implementation’.150  Not only 
does this show the sense of urgency around reform, but it also suggests that ‘regulatory dexterity’ 
can come at the price of due process. 
 
  The third, most recent example of legislative change is the Infrastructure Act 2015.  Before 
going further, it is worth pausing to reflect on the Act’s evolution.  When introduced to the House 
of Lords in Bill form, it contained a hotchpotch of provisions to support Government’s proposals 
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to plan, fund, manage, and maintain the UK’s national infrastructure.  These included requirements 
relating to the management of strategic roads in England, and the control of invasive non-native 
species of plant, but the Bill was initially silent on the subject of fracking.  Provisions on fracking 
were later inserted, showing how the Bill came to be opportunistically repurposed in part for deep, 
horizontal drilling.  Of the several fracking-specific provisions now contained in the Act,151 the 
most controversial is the new land access regime for shale gas developers.  Government was 
concerned that the slow pace of shale gas development was due in part to the difficult and 
protracted process of obtaining either the agreement of all relevant landholders or ancillary rights 
under the Mines (Working Facilities and Support) 1966 Act, as discussed above.  To remedy the 
situation, the Infrastructure Act 2015 creates a new ‘right to use deep-level land’,152 meaning that 
operators wishing to drill for shale gas in another party’s land now have an automatic right of 
access.  There are restrictions on the right – for example, it cannot be exercised at depths of less 
than 300 metres below the surface, or in ‘protected areas’ at depths of less than 1,200 metres.153  
But given that fracking is expected to take place two to three kilometres underground, these 
restrictions are likely to have little practical effect.154  The important point is that, in this setting, 
the rules of trespass and of compulsory rights under the 1966 Act have become redundant, which 
should make it quicker and simpler for shale gas companies to proceed with development.  That 
is, after all, the main reason for Government’s selective approach to streamlining the law. 
 
Domain and Dexterity Together 
Having established that the UK Government relies on two different types of regulatory strategy, 
the article now turns to consider their significance together rather than as separate phenomena.  
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What is interesting but little noticed is that the UK Government deploys arguments of ‘regulatory 
domain’ and ‘regulatory dexterity’ simultaneously.  This throws important new light on how 
divergent regulatory tactics are used in tandem, for although ‘domain’ and ‘dexterity’ retain their 
differences (eg abstract/concrete, continuity/change, and so forth), they also depend on each 
other for meaning and effect.  What remains is to demonstrate how they interrelate.    
 
First, ‘regulatory domain’ and ‘regulatory dexterity’ provide a justificatory basis for each 
other.  One reason for invoking ‘dexterity’, for example, is that it is underpinned by an ostensibly 
sound and solid ‘domain’.  Government argues that legislation should be reformed to encourage 
fracking not only because shale gas offers a cheaper, cleaner, and more secure energy supply, but 
also because robust controls are already in place to protect the environment and ensure safe 
operation.  In assessing the need for underground access rights for shale gas operators (later 
enacted in the Infrastructure Act 2015), DECC found that ‘[s]ince … broader issues of concern 
about the environmental and other impacts of the proposed activities are fully addressed through 
planning and other regulatory frameworks, there is a case for changing the statutory framework to 
provide for underground access without the complexity and expense of the existing procedure’.155  
This gives a sense of how arguments of ‘regulatory domain’ (drawing on the UK’s long experience 
of oil and gas extraction, and its comprehensive regulation of health and the environment) give 
powerful impetus to activities of ‘regulatory dexterity’ (such as reforms of financial regulation and 
trespass law).156  In other words, ‘domain’ proves to be an important discursive resource for the 
promotion of ‘dexterity’. 
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Secondly, ‘regulatory domain’ and ‘regulatory dexterity’ help to shield each other from 
criticism.  Concerns that law is too slow or too general to deal with fracking are allayed by reference 
to speedily introduced fracking-specific legislation.157  Conversely, criticisms that the legislation 
was too hastily conceived or is too narrowly circumscribed are dismissed by reason of law’s stable 
and widely applicable character.158  This means that the regulation of fracking is fixed and all-
embracing (‘domain’) as well as flexible and specifically targeted (‘dexterity’).  It also means that 
regulatory arguments are ‘flattened’ into a single plane, so that there is a great deal of toing and 
froing between ‘regulatory domain’ and ‘regulatory dexterity’ but no attempt to take the discussion 
in other directions.159  Issues such as public participation in decisions relating to fracking and the 
human rights implications of shale gas extraction are conspicuously absent from governmental 
debate, as they fall outside the language of current discussions.160  There is accordingly little 
incentive to consider arguments beyond ‘domain’ and ‘dexterity’, because together ‘domain’ and 
‘dexterity’ form the regulatory whole – or, to use Patricia Ewick and Susan S. Silbey’s phrase, the 
‘hegemonic conception of law’.161  ‘Regulatory dexterity’ makes up for the failure of the ‘regulatory 
domain’ to move with the technological times; ‘regulatory domain’ compensates for acts of 
‘regulatory dexterity’ rushed through the legislative process.  Each works to divert attention from 
the other’s weaknesses, thereby deflecting criticism and maintaining the pretence of order and 
good government.  It is through these two responses, and the opposition between them, that 
fracking regulation becomes difficult to contest on grounds which are not in some way answerable 
by ‘domain’ or ‘dexterity’.  The lesson is that, although ‘domain’ and ‘dexterity’ express two distinct 
approaches to regulation – one based on conventions of abstraction, analogy, coverage, continuity, 
and resistance to reform and the other on concreteness, dissimilarity, inadequacy, change and new 
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regulation – they are complementary inasmuch as they strengthen each other’s influence and 
authority. 
 
Lastly, and related to this, ‘regulatory domain’ and ‘regulatory dexterity’ both operate to 
the same end; that is to say, both are employed to advance the development of the UK’s fracking 
industry.  Clearly, Government wants to have a foot in both camps when it suits its policy 
objectives.  Here we see how ‘domain’ and ‘dexterity’ work in conjunction with each other, not 
just as descriptive accounts of regulation but by seeking to bring certain technological realities into 
being.  Together they have a projective and ‘performative’ effect.  ‘Domain’ and ‘dexterity’ act in 
concert to facilitate shale gas development in the UK – by resisting the introduction of fracking-
specific legislation where it threatens to impede technological progress (‘domain’), and by pressing 
for legislative reform designed to streamline the regulatory process for fracking (‘dexterity’). They 
depict fracking both as equivalent to conventional drilling that is already comprehensively 
regulated (‘domain’) and as involving such transformative change that it requires a dedicated 
regulatory regime (‘dexterity’).  Both depictions play a role in legitimating the UK’s pro-fracking 
policy, by normalising fracking (‘an established technology’162) as well as claiming its novelty (an 
‘exciting new prospect new’163).  Legal interpretation, therefore, can impact significantly on the 
nature and viability of particular technological choices – law is not a neutral arbiter of technological 
outcomes, since ‘domain’ and ‘dexterity’ promote a particular technological trajectory as though 
there are no sound alternatives.164  Their straightjacketing effect needs to be subject to critical 
scrutiny.  By attempting to understand the different, sometimes conflicting, styles of argument and 
courses of action in regulating one particular technology, this article takes a small but important 
step in that direction.  
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Conclusion 
The UK Government’s regulatory response to fracking showcases some of the many ways in 
which law relates to technology.  A critical analysis of Government’s strategy and actions reveals 
two distinct regulatory schemas – ‘regulatory domain’ and ‘regulatory dexterity’ – each relying on 
different interpretive conventions and different methods of approaching regulation.  Arguments 
of ‘regulatory domain’ reflect the understanding that, because fracking is already covered by 
existing regulation, it does not warrant further legislation.  Such arguments position regulation in 
its totality, abstracting general principles of regulation to convey a sense of comprehensiveness 
and control.  From this perspective, fracking is seen as analogous to established drilling methods 
and therefore subject to the same legislative requirements.  Given that regulatory coverage is broad 
and exists at both EU and UK levels, it is assumed to afford adequate protection against the 
potential health and environmental risks.  Owing to the already robust regulatory framework, 
Government has rejected proposals for reform. 
 
 Whereas the regulatory domain (covering health, safety, and the environment) develops an 
untouchable quality, other issues – in this instance, finance, planning permission, and land access 
– are open to revaluation.  This second approach, referred to here as ‘regulatory dexterity’, 
conceives of fracking as dissimilar from conventional drilling methods and in need of targeted 
regulatory reform.  It switches the emphasis from the question of regulatory coverage to that of 
overcoming concrete regulatory inadequacies.  In order to reduce the apparent uncertainty, delay 
and expense associated with the regulatory system – which, curiously enough, are treated as 
problems for fracking but not for other types of technological development – Government has 
introduced several measures of fracking-specific regulation through the passage of new legislation.    
 
It is worth bearing in mind that, even if they seem to be inevitable ways of ‘doing’ 
regulation, neither ‘domain’ nor ‘dexterity’ emerges of its own accord.  Each involves taking a clear 
interpretive stance on issues like the novelty of fracking and the sufficiency of existing regulatory 
provision.  Moreover, the dividing line between ‘domain’ and ‘dexterity’ is not fixed but varies 
depending on how each schema may be used to enable fracking to develop.  It just so happens 
that the rules on finance, planning permission, and land access are the selected targets of regulatory 
dexterity – but they could easily have been construed as parts of the regulatory domain, had their 
reform not raised the prospect of a more fracking-friendly regulatory environment.  So ‘domain’ 
and ‘dexterity’ do not come prepackaged but are open to strategic interpretation.  Crucially, what 
at first sight appear to be inconsistent approaches to regulation turn out to have a close affinity 
with each other.  Despite the fact that ‘domain’ and ‘dexterity’ produce diverse combinations of 
slow and fast, old and new, sameness and difference, stasis and change, both are used to achieve 
the same technological result.  Their oppositional qualities strengthen and legitimise the case for 
fracking by ensuring that the regulation is both stable and responsive, both long-standing and up 
to date, both general and specific.  The implications of regulation purporting to be all things at all 
times, and the normative pull of ‘domain’ and ‘dexterity’ towards a particular technological end, 
deserve closer attention than they have recently found.  This article ‘drills deeper’ into the tactical 
uses of regulation when faced with a seemingly unmissable technological opportunity. 
 
